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RECENT CASES

INDIANS-PROTECTION

OF

PERSONAL

RIGHTS IN

GENERAL-THE

RIGHT OF OFF-RESERVATION INDIANS TO RECEIVE GENERAL WELFARE
ASSISTANCE.

Appellant Ruiz and his family, members of the Papago Tribe
of American Indians, reside in Ajo, Arizona, about fifteen miles
outside the Papago Indian Reservation. They left the reservation
some thirty years ago in search of employment. Ruiz worked in
the copper mines near his home until a strike closed them on July
19, 1967. Unable to find other employment and not eligible for
welfare assistance from the state because he was a striking union
member, Ruiz turned to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.1 The Bureau
denied general assistance benefits because the appellants lived off
the reservation. By Bureau regulation, 2 general assistance benefits
were available only to those Indians living within the boundaries
of a reservation.
Appellants brought a class action in federal district court to
compel payment of benefits to them. The action was dismissed
and a judgment was entered in favor of the Secretary of the
Interior. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found for
the appellants and held that the phrase "throughout the United
States" within the Snyder Act,3 which authorized the Bureau to
expand such monies as Congress may from time to time appropriate
for the benefit, care and assistance of Indians throughout the United
States is expansive in meaning and is not the type of restrictive
phrase Congress would have utilized had it intended to limit general
assistance to reservation Indians. The court further held that even
if the general assistance provision of the Snyder Act was limited
in application to reservation Indians, the congressional intent of
the Snyder Act was clearly to provide assistance for Indians on
and off the reservation, and the Bureau could not amend congressional intent by regulation. Ruiz v. Morton, 462 F.2d 818 (9th Cir.
1972).
The original rule was that existing membership in a tribe
was the requisite for sharing in tribal property.4 But the begin1.
2.
3.
4.
Trust

Hereafter referred to as "the
66 Bureau of Indian Affairs
25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
Sac and Fox Indians v. Sac
Funds, 117 U.S. 288 (1886);

Bureau."
Manual 3.1.4

(A).

and Fox Indians, 220 U.S. 481 (1911); The Cherokee
66 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANUAL 3.1.4 (A).
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ning of the allotment system and the policy of encouraging the
5
abandonment of tribal relations brought a modification of this rule.
Incident to this change in policy, various treaties6 were adopted
and statutes 7 were enacted declaring that the right to share in
tribal property should not be impaired or affected by such severance
of tribal relations. Implicit in this arrangement was the thought that
citizenship was incompatible with continued participation in tribal
government or tribal property.8
The Act of March 3, 1865, 9 provided that certain members of
specified tribes who lived off the reservation would not be deprived
of their annuities if they would adopt civilized conduct as set forth
in the statute. The Act of March 3, 1875,10 provided that "any
Indian" who was the head of a family or who was twenty-one years
old, and "who has abandoned, or may hereafter abandon, his tribal
relations" was entitled to the benefits of the Homestead Act of
1862.11 The act further provided that "any such Indian shall be
entitled to his distributive share of all annuities, tribal funds, lands,
and other property, the same as though he had maintained his
12
tribal relations."
Section 1 of the Act of February 8, 1887,13 gave the right
to an allotment to any Indian "located" upon the reservation, and
Section 414 provided an allotment for any Indian not residing upon
a reservation, or for whose tribe no reservation had been provided.
Most importantly, Section 6 granted citizenship to "every Indian"
who had been accorded an allotment and to "every Indian" born
within the territorial United States who has voluntarily "adopted
the habits of civilized life." Such citizenship was not to affect
or impair "the right of any such Indian to tribal or other property."
A year later Congress declared that every Indian woman who
married a citizen of the United States herself became a citizen,
"Provided, that nothing in this section contained shall impair or
in any way affect the right or title of such married woman to
any tribal property or interest therein." 15
5.

Oakes v. United States, 172 F. 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1909) ; F. COHIEN, HANDBOOK OP

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 186

(1945).

6. E.g., Treaty with Choctaws, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, discussed in Winton v.
Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 388 (1921).
7. E.g., Act of Dec. 19, 1854, ch. 7, § 1(3), 10 Stat. 598, 599, which promised that
the property rights of mixed bloods in the tribal property of the Chippewa Indians would
not be impaired if they remained on the lands ceded to the United States but separated
from the tribe.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

COHEN, HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL INDIAx LAW 153
Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 127, § 4, 13 Stat. 540, 562.
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 131, § 15, 18 Stat. 402, 420.
Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 131, § 15, 18 Stat. 402, 420.
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
25 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
25 U.S.C. § 182 (1971).
F.

(1945).
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In Hy-Yu-Tse-Mil-Kin v. Smith, s the Supreme Court held that
it was not necessary under the Allotment Act of 18851 that the
individual members of the tribes mentioned in the act should actually
be residing on the reservation at the time of the passage of the
act, and Oakes v. United States'8 interpreted the passage of legislation granting various rights to share in tribal property to Indians
residing off a reservation who had severed tribal relations to indicate a new policy by the United States Government. The Court
noted that "the test of the right of individual Indians to share
in tribal lands . . was existing membership in the tribe, and
this wag true of all tribal property." '19 The reason for the original
policy by the United States Government was to isolate Indians
from white society by placing them on remote reservations.20 However, the new policy of the government appeared to encourage
individual Indians to adopt civilized life, and
. . . incident to this change in policy, statutes were enacted
declaring that the right to share in tribal property should
not be impaired or affected by such severance of tribal relations. . . . These acts disclose a settled and persistent
purpose on the part of Congress so to broaden the original
rule respecting the right to share in tribal property as to
place individual Indians who have abandoned tribal relations,
once existing, and have adopted the customs, habits, and
manners of civilized life, upon the same footing, in that
re21
gard, as though they had maintained tribal relations.
This rule was limited by subsequent decisions. LaRoque v.
United States22 restricted inheritance of land allotments to Indians
under the Nelson Act 23 only to heirs of Indians who had- made
a selection of an allotment. Lemieux v. United States24 interpreted
§1 of the Act of February 8, 1887,25 which gave the right to
an allotment of reservation land to an Indian located upon the
reservation, to mean only "a reservation Indian." 26 Tracing the
history of the Bureau's restrictive residence policy regarding wel16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Hy-Yu-Tse-MIl-Kin v. Smith, 194 U.S. 401 (1904).
Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 319, 23 Stat. 340.
Oakes v. United States, 172 F. 305 (1909).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 308-09.
LaRoque v. United States, 239 U.S. 62 (1915).
Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
Lemieux v. United States, 15 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1926).
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
Lemieux v. United States, 15 F.2d 518, 520, (8th Cir. 1926).
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
Lemieux v. United States, 15 F.2d 518, 520 (8th.Cir. 1926).
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fare benefits for off-reservation Indians is difficult. 29 The first formalized notice of the Bureau's residence policy appeared on May
12, 1952, with the publication of the Indian Affairs Manual." The
Bureau at various times has claimed different jurisdiction for different purposes, which has contributed to confusion with regard
to all services provided to Indians by the Bureau.3' Apparently
it is not possible to receive a reliable estimate from the Bureau
as to the number of Indians on the reservations who are not
82
serviced.
The Snyder Act of 192 13 authorized the Bureau under the
Secretary of the Interior to expend such monies as Congress may
appropriate for the "benefit, care and assistance of the Indians
throughout the United States." Part of the authorized expenditures
enumerated under the act were for "general support." But Congress
enacted a very general measure and left the regulatory scheme
to the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau. The result is that
the structure of the welfare system is the Bureau's own creation ,
and actual cash assistance did not begin until 1944.8
In examining the Snyder Act, the court in Ruiz noted that
benefits are to be available to Indians "throughout" the United
States and attached the ordinary meaning of the preposition throughout, which is expansive. 36 The court did not see any indication
by Congress of any contrary definition. Moreover, the court pointed
out that the jurisdictional responsibility of the Bureau has traditionally extended beyond the borders of reservationsA' Statutes, such as
the Snyder Act which were passed for the benefit of Indians and
Indian communities, are to be liberally construed.3 8 On these bases
the court concluded that Congress intended general assistance benefits to be available to all Indians, including Indians living off
the reservation. 89
29. Ruiz v. Morton, 462 F.2d 818, 823 n.20 (1972). The court noted that the residency
restriction appears only in 66 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANUAL 3.1.4(A) and not in
the Code of Federal Regulations. The court felt that the Bureau "is of the opinion that
this section does not 'relate to the public, including Indians.' " The Bureau of Indian

Affairs Manual itself is difficult to obtain, See R. Wolf, Needed: A System of Income
Maintenance For Indians, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 597, 608 (1968), where the author declares
that the entire welfare regulatory scheme of the Bureau "remains inaccessible except to
a few social workers and persistent attorneys."

30.

As noted by the court, Ruiz v. Morton, 462 F.2d 818, 823 (1972).

See 66 BUREAU

or INDI&N AFFAIRS MANUAL 3.1.4(A).

31. See Ruiz v. Morton, 462 F.2d 818, 823-24 (1972).
(1969).
32. See Note, Indians: Better Dead Than Red? 42 S, CAL. L. REv.
83.

101, 118 n.82

25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).

34. Wolf, Needed: A System of Income Maintenance for Indians, 10 Axiz. L. REv. 597,
608 (1968).
85. Id. at 607.
36. Ruiz v. Morton, 462 F.2d 818, 820 (1972).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 821.
39. Id.
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The court then went on to point out that the Bureau itself
has shown an expansive attitude toward its jurisdiction in related
areas of service, including scholarships to off-reservation Indians,
general assistance grants to off-reservations Indians in Alaska and
Oklahoma, and loans and health benefits to off-reservation Indians.' 0
Various commissioners of the Bureau have claimed to provide
services to Indians living "on or near" reservations and have used
the total Indian population of the United States in citing the number
of people their agency serves.", Thus, the court concluded that the
intent of the Snyder Act was unambiguous, and held that the
Bureau could not amend the act by regulation.' 2 However, the court
declined to rule on the due process issue raised by the appellants,
and it expressed no view on the issue of whether Congress could,
if it so desired, limit general assistance benefits to reservation
Indians.' 8
In a dissent, Justice Merrill did not find the Bureau's construction unreasonable. 4 4 He pointed out that the Snyder Act simply
authorized expenditures for Indians, and that the grant of such
broad powers would not preclude reasonable Bureau decisions as
to how its limited funds may be allocated to areas of greatest
need. He found that the classifications were not unreasonable and
were not a denial of equal protection. 4 5 Further, he faced the issue
of whether the regulation infringed appellant's right to travel under
7
Shapiro v. Thompson6 and found that there was no infringement.
On-reservation Indians have generally been excluded from state
welfare programs because of deficiencies in existing state programs,
anti-Indian bias, absence of state programs, and policies of states
that the Bureau general assistance program is an available resource
in the same category as pension or other income, thereby relieving
the state of any duty to provide assistance . Bureau welfare workers
are required to use the state's budgetary plan in their determination
of amounts to be awarded to Bureau general assistance recipients.
Apparently this is motivated by a desire for administrative efficiency, a desire to follow the low payments provided by states,
and political expediency and safety by paying no more than the
states pay rather than a desire to tailor a program to fit the needs
of Indians on a specific reservation. "9
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Ruiz v. Morton, 462 F.2d 818, 826 (1972).
R. Wolf, note 33 supra, at 608-09.
Id. at 609.
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Reservations are usually bleak areas originally granted to the
Indians because they were isolated from the white community and
because the white community did not want the lands thus made
available to the Indians. 50 Indian response to those ghetto-like conditions has been to desert reservation life. Nearly one-third of
America's Indian population had deserted the reservation by 1968.
In part, migration has been implemented by federal programs which
furnish relocation funds, but no post-vocational assistance is included. Often these Indians migrating to urban areas know nothing
of the rudiments of city living, and Indians often experience difficulty finding employment. 5 1 Faced with such considerations, the
court made the proper decision regarding general assistance bene2
fits for off-reservation Indians from a sociological viewpoint.5
Since the decision rested heavily upon the language of the
Snyder Act, the question arises whether the other provisions of
the Snyder Act may be similarly applied. If this question may
be answered affirmatively, Indians living off the reservation
may receive assistance for education, relief of distress, conservation
of health, industrial assistance and advancement, development of
water supplies, employment of physicians, and suppression of liquor
and drugs. While such a holding is desirable in light of the history
of the affairs of the white man and the Indian, it may prove
to cause a repeal or amendment of the Snyder Act to limit such
benefits to the Indians because of real or alleged shortages of
revenues. However, a debt is owed to the American Indian which
has been ignored too long, and it is time that America began
to repay the debt by providing these and other services to Indians,
whether they live on or off the reservation.
RUSSELL J. MYHRE

INDIANS-RESERVATIONS-EFFECT

OF LATER CONGRESSIONAL ACTS

ON ACT ESTABLISHING RESERVATION BOUNDARIES

Appellant, a municipal corporation, brought suit for a declaratory
judgment asserting that the Congressional Act of 1910,1 which
allowed for allotment and sale of certain Fort Berthold Indian Res50.
of the
them.
51.
52.
1.

See generally, D. BRowN, BuRy MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970) for a history
creation of Indian reservations and the methods by which Indians were forced onto
Note, Intdian8: Better Red Tran Dead?, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 118 (1969).
See Comment, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 143 (1954).
Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455.

